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I. Introduction
Standing on the rim o f  San Rafael Swell, a visitor to southern Utah can see the 
contours o f  red sandstone open up across the horizon for almost sixty miles. A single paved 
road travels through a landscape o f  dry washes, desert flats, and sandstone mesa. Like many 
remote areas o f  the West, the region is almost all federally owned, and because o f  this, has 
been embroiled in a battle for decades. The issues at stake are not new to the West; debate 
over appropriate use o f  federal lands has been the center piece o f  western conflict for almost 
as long as people have settled the region. Citizens o f  Emer>' County, however, have 
proposed the San Rafael Swell National Heritage Act as an alternative to years o f  conflict. 
The Act outlines land management guidelines for the region, which according to the 
designers o f  the Act, protects the region’s unique qualities while at the same time providing 
economic benefits for the local community. The citizens o f  Emery County see the Act as 
their opportunity to manage the land locally.
The process that led to the Act is unclear, and at this point, it is too early to offer any 
substantive evaluation. The importance o f  this Act, however, is that it represents a major
shift in the approach to public land and natural resource management percolating across 
the West. States such as Utah, are poised at the beginning o f  a power shift—a shift from 
centralized management o f  public lands' to more localized, collaborative decision making
See Donald Snow, Em pire or Homelands? A Revival o f  Jeffersonian D emocracy in the 
Am erican fVest, in The Next West: Public lands. Community and Economy in the 
American West 181, 185 (John A. Baden & Donald Snow eds.) (1997) [hereinafter The
1
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among diverse interests.* Rural communities, at one time the center o f  public land
debates, are helping to drive this new movement^ as diverse interests such as loggers and
conservationists join together to resolve contentious public land issues."^ This Paper
addresses the question o f  whether these efforts, often described as "collaborative decision
m aking” or “collaborative groups,” are appropriate for public land decision making. It
also seeks to explore the proper legal and political boundaries o f  their authority.
Collaborative groups are defined as “the deliberate use o f  unusual coalitions to
work on natural resource and environmental issues.”  ̂Collaborative decision making has
also been described as “environmental democracy.” Environmental democracy
entails wider involvement by local communities and lay persons and the 
introduction o f  more di\'erse types o f  information in the decision making process 
for protecting the environment, has received increasing support.^
Next West].
See Barb Cestero, Beyond the Hundredth Meeting: A Field Guide to Collaborative 
Conservation on the W est’s Public Lands 3 (1999) [hereinafter Cestero].
3
See id.
A
See id  at 63.
5
Donald Snow, speech at “Coming Together on the Land: Evaluating Collaborative 
Process in Natural Resource M anagement.” Collaboration: A Threat or Menace, at 2
(1998) [hereinafter Snow].
A
Kris Wemstedt, Terra Firma or Terra Incognita'^ Western Land Use, H azardous 
waste, and the Devolution o f  U.S. Federal Environm ental Programs. Natural Resource 
Journal, 2000.
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Generally, these groups are comprised o f  former adversaries or ‘“coalitions o f  the unalikc’ 
. . , such as Trout Unlimited members, hydro power producers and irrigation district 
leaders."' Commonly, collaborative groups address issues o f  both local and national 
c o n cern /  such as controlling the impacts o f  recreation on desert landscapes in southern 
Utah.’ While some collaborative groups chose to negotiate formal agreements, often 
submitting management proposals to federal agencies for possible ratification,'^ other 
collaborative groups see their role as informative, educating the public on the 
implications o f  natural resource decisions." While the issues and organizational 
structures may differ between groups, the driving forces are universal—more 
collaborative, local planning that considers the needs o f  citizens most directly affected by 
public land management decisions.'*
Local participation, however, does not mean local control. Because many o f  the
See Snow, supra  note 5 at 2.
8
See id.
The Canyon County Partnership, a coalition o f federal management agencies and state 
and county government from around Moab, Utah, joined together to develop a 
management plan to address the boom in recreation that threatens the fragile desert 
landscape o f  southern Utah. See Cestero, supra  note 7, at 57.
!U
See id. 
11
See id.
12
See id.
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communities across the West are surrounded by public lands, the issues are likely to 
involve national concerns as well.*’ Therefore, successful collaborati\ e groups often 
inelude national representatives, such as the Defenders o f  Wildlife, working alongside 
local citizens.''^
The difference between legal authority and political power is fundamental to 
defining the limits o f  collaboration and has led to debates over the usefulness o f  
collaborative groups in public land decision making.*^ Advocates describe this 
phenomena as an experiment in new governance, a revival o f  Jeffersonian democracy in 
which local citizens engage in the decisions that affect them directly.'^ Advocates also 
argue that collaborative groups embody “the devolution o f  real power to the citizenry, and 
the creation o f  new institutions o f  responsibility to manage that power.’" ' As public land
13
Sec Snow, supra  note 5. at 2.
14
See Cestero, supra  note 2, at 63.
15
Sec generally  George C. Coggins, "Devolution in Federal Land Law: Abdication by Any 
O ther N am e  . . . , 3 Hastings W.-N.W.J.Envtl. L. & Pol’y 211 (1996) (discussing lack o f 
legal and political framework for collaboration and devolution)[hereinafter Coggins, 
D evolution in Federal L and  Law]\ George C. Coggins, Regulating Federal Natural 
Resources: A Sum m ary Case Against D evolved Collaboration, 25 Ecology L.Q. 602
(1999) (criticizing collaboration efforts on public lands)[hereinafter Coggins, Regulating  
Federal N atural Resources]\ Cestero, supra  note 6 (discussing collaborative decision 
making on public lands).
I 6
See  The Next West, supra  note 1, at 185.
17
Id.
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management enters a state o f  flux,'* collaborative decision making offers an alternative to 
traditional interest group advocacy in which "single-issue advocacy and user groups 
compete for influence over agency decisions.'""
Critics, however, fear that this movement is another ploy by pro- development 
forces to capture the decision making process, particularly as changes in land 
management are less favorable to traditional public land uses.'" At its core, critics argue, 
collaborative decision making runs counter to the policies underlying public land laws: 
federal agencies are generally prohibited from delegating management authority, 
particularly to a small cadre o f  local citizens."' For instance. Professor George Coggins, a 
legal scholar on public land issues in the West, has vociferously condemned collaborative 
decision m aking." While he acknowledges that federal laws allow agencies wide latitude 
to implement management objectives, he argues that collaborative decision making
IS
See id.
Cestero, supra  note 2, at 4.
:o
See  Coggins, ‘'Devolution in Federal Land Law, supra  note 15, at 211.
2 1
See generally  Coggins, D evolution in Federal Land Law, supra  note 15 (discussing 
lack o f  legal and political framework for collaboration and devolution); Coggins, 
Regulating Federal Natural Resources, supra  note 15 (criticizing collaboration efforts on 
public lands).
Sec generally  Coggins, Devolution in Federal Land Law, supra  note 15 (discussing 
lack o f  legal and political framework for collaboration and devolution); Coggins, 
Regulating Federal N atural Resources, supra  note 15 (criticizing collaboration efforts on 
public lands).
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exceeds these limits."^ Instead o f  resolving contentious issues, he asserts, collaboration is 
merely an abdication o f  management responsibilities by federal land managers.-■* In fact, 
Coggins reasons that federal bureaucrats only embrace the collaborative process because 
it allows them to “[pass] the buck on difficult and controversial allocation issues.”*''
In spite of, or maybe in part because of, the debate surrounding the appropriate 
legal and political framework o f  collaborative decision making, collaborative groups are 
becoming increasingly ensconced across the West.*^ However, collaborative decision 
making is a recent phenomena in the public land arena*' and, therefore, the proper 
boundaries o f  this type o f  decision making remain unclear.** Court decisions and 
congressional action frame different, and often inconsistent approaches to collaborative 
decision making. In late 1998. Congress attached a rider to the omnibus spending bill, 
which mandated that the United States Forest Serv ice implement a locally initiated 
citizen proposal for managing an area o f  land that included almost three national forest in
See Coggins, Devolution in Federal Land La\\\ supra  note 15, at 211.
See  Coggins, D evolution in Federal Land Law, supra  note 15, at 211.
25
Coggins, Regulating Federal Natural Resources, supra  note 15 at 603.
2f.
See Lisa Jones, Howdy, Neighbor! As a Last Resort, Westerners Start Talking To Each 
Other, High Country News, May 13. 1996. 28(9), at 1, 6-8 ; The Next West, supra  note 
at 186.
27
See The Next West, supra  note 1, at 186.
2S
See infra  Part III (discussing legal scope o f collaboration).
6
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the Sierra mountains o f  northern C a l i f o rn ia . I n  contrast, less than a year later, in a 
decision o f  first impression, the D.C. Circuit Court held, in N ational Park and  
Conse}'\>ation Association v. Stanton,^*' that the National Park Service unlaw fully 
delegated its statutory authority to manage the Niobrara Wild and Scenic River to a local 
council.-' Because o f  these conflicting authorities, a uniform standard for collaborative 
decision making is unclear.
This Paper suggests that while collaborative decision making must be approached 
cautiously,-* it offers a workable approach to expanding public participation in allocating 
federally owned natural resources. However, defining the legal boundaries o f  
collaborative involvement in decision making is critical. As such, I suggest that 
Congress’s decision to legislate a locally designed management proposal in California is 
politically and legally unsupportable and runs counter to the purpose o f  federal land laws. 
Congressional legislation that bypasses federally mandated decision making expands 
collaboration decision making beyond appropriate levels and, therefore, should be 
discouraged. Conversely, the D.C. Circuit Court’s holding in N ational Park and
19
See infra Part III (discussing congressional legislation o f  citizen initiated management 
plan).
30
54 F. Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 1999).
31
Sec infra Part IV (discussing legal boundaries o f  collaborative decision making 
authority).
32
See  Snow, supra  note 5, at 2.
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C onsen ’ation Association  v. Stanton unduly limits collaborative decision making through 
its narrow interpretation o f  the "unlawful sub delegation doctrine. '
As an alternative to these approaches. I recommend that the appropriate legal 
boundaries for collaborative decision making center on three issues: (1 ) collaborative 
groups must comply with existing public lands laws; (2) agencies must be allowed 
flexibility under the sub delegation doctrine to interpret final reviewing authority; and (3) 
collaborative decision making must consider national as well as local interest.
Part II o f  this Paper outlines the evolution o f  collaborative decision making on 
public lands; it discusses the political and legal changes in public land management that 
led to the rise in collaborative decision making. Part III addresses the tension between the 
courts and Congress, and outlines the legal boundaries o f  collaborative decision making. 
Part VI analyzes both the future o f  coliaborali\ e groups as a force in natural resource 
decision making, and the confiictiiig legal guidelines addressing the scope o f  their 
authority. Finally, Part VI concludes that federal regulations should incorporate 
collaborative decision making into regulations that guide natural resource allocation.
See infra Part III.A (defining unlawful sub delegation doctrine).
8
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II. Unrest in Public Land States: Laying the Foundation 
for Collaborative Decision Making
The forces driving collaborative decision making are well documented.^'’ Economic, 
political, and demographic changes across the W est" have laid the foundation for what 
Donald Snow, a scholar and writer on public lands, describes as a "renaissance o f  the local. 
The following section offers a brief explanation o f  how collaborative decision making 
emerged in response to these changes.
A. A C entioy o f  Centralized M anagem ent Begins to Crumble:
The Failure o f  Scientific M anagement
While collaborative decision making has spurred widespread debate,'^ critics and 
advocates generally agree that it runs counter to public land laws and customs.^* An in-depth
34
See generally  Cestero, supra  note 2 (discussing collaborative decision making on public 
lands); The Swan Valley, infra note OO (discussing collaboration efforts in Swan Valley, 
Montana); The Next West, supra  note 1 (discussing changes in western politics, 
demographics, and economy).
35
See  The Next West, supra  note 1, at 185.
3ft
See The Next West, supra  note 1, at 185.
37
See supra  Part I (discussing collaboration generally); see generally  Coggins, Devolution 
in Federal Land Law. supra  note 15 (discussing lack o f  legal and political framework for 
collaboration and devolution); Coggins, Regulating Federal Natural Resources, supra 
note 15 (criticizing collaboration efforts on public lands).
38
See Snow, supra  note 5, at 8; see generally  Coggins, D evolution in Federal Land Law. 
supra  note 15 (discussing lack o f  legal and political framework for collaboration and 
devolution); Coggins, Regulating Federal natural Resources, supra  note 15 (criticizing 
collaboration efforts on public lands).
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discussion o f  the failures o f  scientific management are beyond the scope o f  this paper. 
However, a brief discussion highlights the emergence o f  collaborative decision making as 
a response to the failure o f  scientific management to allocate natural resources. Historically, 
centralized decision making has been the driving force behind management o f  public lands 
and natural re so u rc e s .P re s id e n t  Theodore Roosevelt, with the help o f  Gifford Pinchot, the 
first ch ie f  o f  the Forest Service, implemented a centralized management system based on 
Progressive Era ideals o f  governance; technocrats and experts regulate the allocation o f  
natural resources, therefore, removing the decision making process from the public forum. 
While this system remains the foundation o f  public land management today,"*" critics have 
argued that centralized management has failed."*' Instead o f  Roosevelt’s vision o f  a de­
politicized decision making process, “the heavy hand o f  politics [can be seen] on virtually 
every major decision made by the land and water agencies.
Economists and political scientists are equally critical o f  centralized management.
See generally  Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel o f  Efficiency: The 
Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 (1959) (discussing the rise o f  
Progressivism and the effect on scientific, centralized management o f  public land); Paul 
W. Hirt, A  Conspiracy o f  Optimism: Management o f  the National Forests Since World 
W ar Two (1994) (analyzing Forest Service history); Cawley R. McGreggor, Federal 
Land, Western Anger: The Sagebrush Rebellion and Environmental Politics (1993) 
(discussing history o f federal land management in West).
40
See generally  Hirt, supra  note 39 (analyzing Forest Service history).
41
See The Next West, supra  note 1, at 185.
42
See The Next West, supra  note 1, at 192.
10
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Robert Nelson, an expert on public land reform and resource economics, argues that federal 
land management agencies are forced to '“do the wrong t h i n g . A g e n c y  budgets are 
attached to pro-development schemes and most o f  the guiding statutes are antiques, 
“holdover[s] from the earliest years o f  the century, when promoting western development 
was regarded as an unqualified holy."'" Finally, “the call for greater local involvement in 
federal environmental decision making . . ,  has arisen from the perceived inability of purely 
scientific and technical endeavors to adequately frame and answer environmental 
questions.
By the 1990’s, federal land management agencies were caught in the middle o f  an 
unprecedented controversy: environmentalists condemned the agencies’ environmentally 
destructive, but legislatively driven policies, while industry' and development interests 
accused the agencies o f  sanctioning the decreasing emphasis on multiple use.'**' Although 
most interests involved in public lands agree that reforming centralized management is 
necessary, the shape o f  this reform remains unclear.'^'
43
See The Next West, supra  note 1, at 191.
44
See The Next West, supra  note 1, at 191.
43
Kris Wemstedt, Terra Firma or Terra hicoguiia? Western Land Use, Hazardous Waste, 
and the Devolution o f  U.S. Federal Environm ental Programs, Natural Resource Journal, 
2000 .
4 5
See  Hirt, supra  note 39, at xv.
47
See The Next West, supra  note 1, at 190-94.
1 1
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B. Fertile Political Ground: the Changing  
Political Landscape o f  the fVest
The changing political atmosphere o f  the West has also contributed to the emergence 
o f  collaborative groups.'*’̂ Collaborative decision making, in large part, was a response to the 
political gridlock that evolved out o f  the environmental activism o f  the 1960s and early 
1970s/' ' During these years, environmentalists had been profoundly successful at galvanizing 
westerners in support o f  environmental issues/'^ However, the 1980s were plagued by 
political backlash and by the middle o f  the decade, environmentalists struggled to retain their 
advances."' Ironically, while public support rose for anti-environmental factions, federal 
policies continued to de- emphasize development on public lands. By the beginning o f  the 
1990s, the ramifications o f  these events could be seen in rural communities across the 
West—stories o f  resource dependent towns struggling with shrinking timber sales and 
mistrust o f  federal agency management agendas are well docum ented.- Against this 
backdrop, many environmentalists, as well as resource interests, began looking for more
48
See The Next West, supra  note 1, at 185.
See  Snow, supra  note 5, at 3.
See Snow, supra  note 5, at 3.
51
See  Snow, supra  note 5, at 3.
Some well known examples include Quincy, California, Beaverhead County, Montana, 
Swan Valley, Montana, and Applegate Valley, Oregon. See generally  Cestero, supra  note 
6 (discussing examples o f  collaboration efforts in West).
12
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productive approaches to address the stalemate that had settled over federal lan d s / '
Environmentalists also began to fear that traditional forms o f  politics contributed to 
the alienation o f  local communities/^ It became apparent that citizens were disillusioned 
with the litigious and regulator)' approach to environmental p ro tec tion / ' in which local 
citizens had been “dealt out o f  the game by a decades-long battle among communities o f  
‘experts.’”'’'' And, over time “[a]s the [natural resource] issues seemed to climb higher into 
the stratosphere o f politics, the people who lived closest to the resources in question seemed 
to have less and less to do with it all.”-̂  Collaborative decision making, it seemed to many, 
offered local citizens the opportunity to influence decisions regarding the lands in their 
communities and provided public land interests groups-'^ the opportunity to approach the 
issue o f  resource allocation more e f fe c t iv e ly .A s  one western governor stated;
We have to show in plain and simple actions that the environment, the economy, and
See Snow supra  note 5, at 3.
54
See Inter\'iew with Barb Cestero, Program Associate, Sonoran Institute, in Bozeman, 
Montana (Dec. 4, 1999) [hereinafter Cestero Interv'iew].
55
See The Next West, supra  note 5, at 195.
56
Snow, supra  note 5, at 5.
57
Snow, supra  note 5, at 5.
58
Public land interest groups include resource users such as timer industry representatives, 
ranchers, recreationists, miners, preser\^ationists, and wildlife interest groups.
See  The Next West, supra  note 1, at 185-86.
13
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the community are compatible. Our citizens are tired o f  the judicial gridlock and 
they're feeling left out o f  the process. They are willing and able to participate. . .
C  M ovement Toward Increased Public Participation: The 
National Environmental Protection Act and  
the N ational Forest M anagement Act
Public participation in land management decision making is not ne%. Federal laws 
passed in the late 1960s and early 1970s recognized the desire for increased public 
involvement in the decision making process.*"^ The National Environmental Protection Act 
("NEPA")"^ and the National Forest Management Act ("NFMA")'^- are the primary laws 
guiding public involvement in decisions on federal l a n d s . B o t h  the language o f the Acts, 
as well as their implementing regulations, define traditional approaches to public 
participation on federal l a n d s . W h i l e  these laws marked a watershed in federal land 
management by opening up the decision making process to public review, both laws failed 
to fully engage the public in the decision making process. This section
See  Barb Cestero, From Conflict to Driven? A Social and Political History o f 
Environmental Collaboration in the Swan Valley. Montana, 20 (1997) (unpublished M.S. 
thesis. University o f  Montana (Missoula)) (on file with University o f  Montana Library) 
[hereinafter The Swan Valley].
Jfg 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-14 (1994).
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370d (1995).
(.2
16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-14 (1994); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 432l-4370d (1995).
64
See The Swan Valley, supra  note 60, at 18.
14
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provides a b rie f  summars' o f  the laws and offers a critique o f  each Act's failure to fully 
engage the public in the decision making process.
1. N ational Environm ental Protection Act
(a) Background
Congress passed NEPA in 1969 against a backdrop o f  environmental awareness and 
public demand for increased influence over and access to federal decision making.^- Briefly, 
NEPA outlines procedural guidelines for federal agency decision making and includes public 
review o f  agency d e c i s i o n s . N E P A  is considered the first environmental law o f  the 
environmental age, and was created with the intention o f  developing a national policy that 
would make federal agencies more sensitive to the ecological impacts o f  their decisions.'’" 
While the Act is substantively thin, the language outlines lofty ideals for federal 
environmental management: “ [t]o declare a national policy which will encourage productive 
and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts that will 
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and
See The Swan Valley, supra  note 60 at 18 (citing U.S. Congress, Office o f  Technology' 
Assessm ent, Forest Service Planning: Accommodation Uses, Producing Outputs and 
Sustaining Ecosystems (1992)).
See George Cameron Coggins et a l .  Federal Public Land and Natural Resource Law 333 
(3ded. 1993).
fS7
See Wendy Nelson Espeland, Bureaucrats and Indians in a Contemporary Colonial 
Encounter, Law and Social Inquiry, Spring 2001.
15
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welfare o f  man.” ’̂̂
However, simply declaring that agencies be committed to protecting the environment 
seemed unlikely to generate change.*'*  ̂ Instead, drafters inserted section 102, which requires 
agencies to prepare Environmental Impact Statements (HIS). Under section 102, agencies 
must complete an EIS before any major federal action, such as permitting a proposed mine, 
takes p lace/"  The EIS, among other things, provides a detailed description o f  the significant 
impacts, predicted outcomes, and environmental and social costs and benefits o f  each 
alternative. In a significant change from pre-NEPA agency decision making, NEPA allows, 
and in fact requires public input and review o f  agency decisions through the comment and 
appeal process.^' While the process is administratively complex, the agencies primarily use 
public involvement as a method to gather information and educate the public.’-
(b) Benefits
NEPA has been applauded for opening up the decision making process by requiring
hK
42 U.S.C. 4321.
See W endy Nelson Espeland, Bureaucrats and Indians in a Conteniporaiy Colonial 
Encounter, Law and Social Inquiry, Spring 2001.
7(1
See George Cameron Coggins et al.. Federal Public Land and Natural Resource Law 333- 
35 (3d ecF 1993).
71
See id. at 335.
72
See  The Swan Valley, supra  note 60, at 21.
16
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federal agencies to make information they considered in the decision making process 
available to the public. Advocates o f  NEPA contend that this requirement “ensures that the 
public, including environmental groups, can play a role in both the decision making process 
and the implementation o f  that decision. Publication o f  the EIS provides the public with an 
assurance that the agency has indeed, considered environmental concerns in its decision­
making process.” -̂’ In fact, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), in its twenty-five 
year review o f  NEPA concluded that;
Since its enactment, NEPA has significantly increased public information and 
input into agency decision-making. NEPA opened up for public scrutiny the planning 
and decision-making processes o f  federal agencies, in many cases providing the only 
opportunity for the public to affect these processes. Partly as a result o f  NEPA, public 
knowledge o f  and sophistication on environmental issues have significantly increased 
over the last 25 years. So too ha\'e public demands for effective and timely 
involvement in the agency decision-making processes.
(c) Challenges
Despite N EPA ’s innovations and its successes, N E P A ’s limitations are well 
documented. Although its goal was to promote positive environmental policies, the law
73
Frona M. Powell, The North American Commission For Environm ental Cooperation 's 
San Pedro Report: A Case Study and Analysis o f  the CEC Process, En\ironmental 
Lawyer, June 2000.
74
Id.
17
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does not require agencies to chose environmentally superior alternatives/^ Instead. NEPA 
merely requires agencies to comply with the EIS process. In fact, the United States Supreme 
Court has determined that NEPA is a procedural, rather than substantive law.’’'’ According!), 
“ if  the adverse environmental effects o f  the proposed action are adequately identified and 
evaluated, the agenc)' is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values outw eigh 
the environmental costs. . . NEPA merely prohibits uniformed rather than unwise agency
action.” ’̂
Perhaps, more importantly in the context o f  collaborative decision making, NEPA 
has also been criticized for its failure to engage the public in meaningful ways.^^ Jonathon 
Poisner, Professor o f  Law, argues that the Act and its regulations curtail meaningful public 
involvement in the decision making process. The laws do not specifically require the agency 
to actively involve citizens m the decision making process. Instead, they obligate the agency 
to merely consider environmental impacts and demonstrate by fully disclosing these impacts 
that they considered them. Therefore, although the law designates specific guidelines to
75
See Wendy Nelson Espeland, Bureaucrats and Indians in a Contem porajy Colonial 
Encounter, Law and Social Inquiry, Spring 2001.
76
Frona M. Powell, The North Am erican Commission For Environm ental Cooperation's 
San Pedro Report: A Case Study and Analysis o f  the CEC Process, En\'ironmental 
Lawyer, June 2000.
' f d.
^^See The Swan Valley, supra note 60, at 19.
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inform the public, responsibility for project development is retained by the agency/'' Many 
critics also argue that an institutional desire to protect agency discretion is at the root o f  these 
procedures. The result, then, is a public that is not engaged in making the decisions but is 
merely reviewing the decision already made by the agency. Agencies are "solely 
responsible for developing the proposed project, conducting all necessary' analysis, and 
providing citizens with pertinent information.”'̂ " Agencies retain considerable discretion for 
the methods and timing o f  public involvement.'^' Consequently, public participation is stalled 
at the input level o f  the decision making continuum.
Similarly, another critic observed;
that attempts to involve agency and public collaboration in the NEPA process has not 
worked well. Citizens often feel that decisions have already been made. Parties 
generally report being surprised and not consulted until the process is well underway, 
by which time it is difficult to influence its direction. The final, serious flaw that 
critics point out is NEPA's lack o f attention to the human dimensions o f  the decision 
making process. The social, economic and cultural effects o f  decisions are seldom.
Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the National Environmental Policy 
Act's Process for Citizen Participation. 26 Envtl. L. 53, 54-55 (1996) (stating that NEPA 
led to an unprecedented level o f  citizen participation in environmental decisionmaking, 
spawning a great national experiment in participatory pluralism);
so
See The Swan Valley, supra  note 60. at 19. (citing Robert B. Keiter, NEPA and the 
Em erging Concept o f  Ecosystem M anagement on the Public Lands. Land and Water 
Review XXV (1): 43-60).
See The Swan Valley, supra  note 60, at 19.
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or al least not systematically, considered as required by N E P A /-
Finally, although these criticisms refer to the limitations o f  public participation in
Endangered Species Act, these observations resonate with NEPA:
Public notice, comment, and hearings tend to limit citizens to reacting to proposals 
already developed. Collaborative decision-making, or interactive participation, which 
includes stakeholders in "face-to-face problem solving," offers greater opportunities 
for creative public involvement. This is particularly true in planning, where panels 
or working groups may meet periodically to identify information needs, raise issues, 
propose new approaches, or monitor progress.
In conclusion, NEPA has failed to engage the public in the decision making process. 
According to Poisner, "NEPA fails as a means for encouraging deliberative democracy. . . 
. As a result, N E PA ’s citizen participation generates more heat than light, creating citizen 
participation pathologies that leave both citizens and agencies frustrated by the process.” '"*
(d) The Next Step: Collaboration and NEPA
Supporters o f  collaboratives recognize the importance o f  reconciling collaborativ e
Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the National Environmental Policy 
Act's Process for Citizen Participation. 26 Envtl. L. 53. 54-55 ( 1996).
Robert L. Fischman and Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson fo r  Conservation From Pollution 
Control Law: Cooperative Federalism for Recovery under the Endangered Species Act. 
Columbia Journal o f  Environmental Law, 2002 (internal citations omitted).
S4
Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the N ational Environmental Policy 
Act's Process for Citizen Participation. 26 Envtl. L. 53, 54-55 (1996).
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decision making with NEPA:
currently there is growing interest in finding ways to make the "NEPA process" more 
collaborative across not only federal agencies, but also state and local agencies, 
non-government associations (NGO), and private landowners. . . Indeed, 
collaboration, collaborative planning, ecosystem management, and sustainability are 
all common terms o f  reference in environmental policy today and when one searches 
the roots o f  this change, one returns to the simple words o f  NEPA.'^^
If  N E P A ’s ability to institute ecologically sound decisions is limited, how then can 
a colloborative approach fit into exiting NEPA guidelines? The intersection between NEPA 
and collaborative decision making will be integral to developing a workable framework for 
collaboration.
2. The N ational Forest M anagement Act
While the National Forest Management Act (“N FM A ”) is less important to this 
discussion, however, a brief discussion is n e c e s sa ry .N F M A  was passed by Congress in 
1976, legislated unprecedented restraints on the Forest Service^^ as well as providing for
85
Margaret A. Shannon, Will NEPA he “An Agenda for the Future  " Or Will It Become “A 
Requiem For the Past A Book Review o f  the National Environm ental Policy Act: An 
Agenda For the Future. Buffalo Environmental Law ,loumal. Fall, 2000).
86 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-1614(1994).
87
See Charles F. Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian: Land, Water, and the Future of 
the West 144-45 (1992).
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public participation in Forest Serv'ice management/^ Generally, NTMA guides Forest 
Ser\dce land use planning by directing the Secretary o f  Agriculture to de\elop 
comprehensive, long range management plans (referred to as forest plans) for each national 
forest/'^ All management decisions, therefore, must be consistent with these p la n s .S im i la r  
to NEPA, NFM A also affirmed citizens’ right to review Forest S en  ice decision making and 
contains specific language regarding public participation.’” Specifically, NFMA requires 
“public participation in the development, review, and revision o f  land management plans 
including, but not limited to, making the plans or revisions available to the public . . .  the 
Secretary shall publicize and hold public meetings . . . that foster public participation.’”̂* 
However, similar to the public participation components contained in NEPA, NFMA also 
fails to engage citizens in the decision making process/^
3. The Federal A dvison ' Committee Act
See The Swan Valley, supra  note 60, at 19.
See George Cameron Coggins et ah. Federal Public Land and Natural Resource Law (3d 
ed. 1993k
4(1
See id.
VI
See The Swan Valley, supra note 60, at 19.
16U .S .C .A .§ 1604(d) (1994).
See  The Swan Valley, supra  note 60, at 23.
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While an in depth discussion o f the Federal Advisor) Committee Act (FACA) is 
beyond the scope o f  this Paper, it is important to touch on it briefly. F AC A was original!) 
designed to control the influence o f  special interest groups on federal ad\ isor)' committees. 
The Act requires that federal advisory committees have balanced memberships, open 
meetings, public access to meeting minutes, and limits on the amount o f  committees 
formed''"^. Historically, this law has been viewed as a legal roadblock to agency participation 
in collaborative decision making. One author argues that the sweep o f  lawsuits against 
federal agencies created a “FACA-phobia.”'̂ - However, both the federal agencies and the 
local, community groups overestimated FA C A ’s restrictions. The outcome o f  a series of 
lawsuits by environmentalists alleging that agency participation in community-collabortaive 
groups violated FACA seem to indicate that F AC A does not inhibit the development of 
collaborative groups."’ In Public Citizen v. United States D ep't o f  J u s tic e ^  the court stated 
that FACA applies only to groups "organized b ) , or closely tied to, the [f]edera!
W4
Thomas C. Beierle and Rebecca J. Long, Chilling Collaboration: The Federal Advisory' 
Com mittee Act and Stakeholder Involvement in Environmental Decisionmaking, 
Environmental Law Reporter, July 1999).
S'5
Sean T. McAllister, The Confluence o f  a River and a Community: An Experiment with a 
Com m unitv-Based W atershed M anagement in Southwestern Colorado, University o f  
Denver Water Law Review, Spring 2000.
Id.
491 U.S. 440, 461 (1989) (It was not the intent o f  FACA to bring all “private advisory 
committees within F A C A ’s terms. . . [and is] "limited to groups organized by, or closely 
tied to, the Federal Government, and thus enjoying quasi-public status.” ).
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[gjovemment, and thus enjoying a quasi-public status."’'̂  Therefore, collaborati\ e efforts 
that are “consultative forms o f  public involvement,” do not trigger FACA. '
48
Id.
Thomas C. Beierle and Rebecca J. Long, Chilling CollaboraHon: The Federal Advisory 
Com m ittee A ct and Stakeholder Involvement in Environmental Decision Making. 
Environmental Law Reporter (1999).
24
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
III. The Legal Scope o f Collaboration: Tensions Betw een 
the Coup and Congress.
Court decisions and congressional action frame different and often inconsistent 
approaches to public participation in natural resource decision making. Therefore, a 
discussion o f  these authorities outlines the legal parameters that surround collaboration. 
Because defining the legal scope o f  collaboration is fundamentally a question o f  determining 
the acceptable levels o f  authority an agency may delegate to a citizen g r o u p , a  discussion 
o f  the unlawful sub delegation doctrine provides an appropriate starting point. Following 
that. Part III addresses the D C .  Circuit Court’s interpretation o f  the unlawful sub delegation 
doctrine in N ational Park and C onsenation  Association  v. Stanton'^’̂ as it applies to local 
decision making on National Park Service land. Finally, Part 111 ends with a discussion o f 
Congress’ decision to mandate legislatively a citizen initiated management proposal.
A. Constitutional Restraints to Local Decision Making: 
Unlawful Sub Delegation Doctrine
The Constitution delegates exclusively to Congress the power to make necessar>' and
I i)i.)
See generally  Coggins, Devolution in Federal Land Law, supra  note 15 (discussing lack 
o f  legal and political framework for collaboration and devolution); Coggins. Regulating  
Federal N atural Resources, supra note 15 (criticizing collaboration efforts on public 
lands).
Mil
54 F. Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 1999).
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proper rules for governing federal property.’®- In response to this mandate. Congress has 
delegated regulatory power to four main federal land management agencies-the Forest 
Serv ice, the Bureau o f  Land Management, the National Park Serv ice, and the Fish and 
Wildlife Service.'®-'
The unlawful delegation doctrine addresses delegation from Congress to an agency,''’ 
and the unlawful sub delegation doctrine outlines the limits o f  the agencies' ability to 
delegate decision making authority to citizens.'®"' The law is well established that Congress 
may, without violating the unlawful delegation doctrine, grant authority to an executive 
agency to adopt rules and regulations, as long as it provides some "intelligible principle" by 
which the agency is to exercise that authority. Therefore, Congress must delegate to the 
executive branch the authority to manage federal property.'®- Congressional delegation is 
common, and in fact, was upheld as early as 1911, when the United States Supreme Court 
decided United States v, GriniaiidU'’ Similarly, ihe Court has allowed “implied” delegations
102
See  U.S. Const, art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
103
See Coggins, Regulating Federal Natural Resources, supra note 15 (citing George C. 
)gîCogains & Robert L. Glicksman, Public Natural Resource Law (Supp. 1990)).
104
See N ational Park and  C o n sen ’ation Ass d. v. Stanton, 54 F. Supp.2d 7, 18 (D.D.C. 1999) 
(citing Perot v. Federal Election Comm'n, 97 F.3d 553, 557 (D C. Cir. 1996)).
10?
M istretta  v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372, (1989) (quoting T. IT. Hampton, Jr. Co.
V. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406,(1928)).
lOtj
220 U.S. 506 (1911) (“Congress may certainly delegate to others powers which the 
legislature may rightfully exercise i tse lf” )
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by congressional acquiescence.'*^^
However, the courts have interpreted the unlawful sub delegation doctrine to prohibit 
agencies from delegating their authority to implement a statute to a prix ate entity.'*’" When 
Congress vests an agency with the authority to administer a statute, the agency may not shift 
that responsibility to a private entity, particularly when the entity’s subjectivity is 
questionable due to conflicts o f  interest.'"'' However, in some instances. Congress may allow 
agencies to delegate their authority."" Below is a discussion o f  the limited case law 
addressing the doctrine o f  unlawful delegation.
Perot Federal Election Commission outlines the parameters o f  proper delegation 
by an agency to a private entity. In Perot, the Federal Election Committee, a federal agency, 
issued a regulation permitting eligible non- profit organizations to host candidate debates.
IU7
See United States i ’. M idwest OiL 236 U.S. 459 (1915) ( an implied grant o f  power to 
preserve the public interest would arise out o f . .  . congressional acquiescence.” ).
lus
See N ational Park and C onsen ’ation Ass n., 54 F. Supp.2d at IS (citing Perot v. Federal 
Election C om m ’n, 97 F.3d 553, 557 (D C. Cir. 1996)). While courts generally refer to the 
doctrine as the “unlawful sub delegation doctrine,” the National Park and C onsen’ation 
Association  court referred to it as the “doctrine o f  unlawful delegation” for simplicity 
purposes. Id.
109
See id. at 18 (citing Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 962 (5th Cir. 1983)); see also 
Perot 1’. Federal Election Comm'n, 97 F.3d 553, 559 (D C .Cir.1996). Cf. A.L.A. 
Schechter P o id tty  Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537, 55 S.Ct. 837, 846, 79 L.Ed. 
1570(1935) .
I Kl
United States v. Widdowson, 916 F.2d 587, 592 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. 
Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (“ [t]he relevant inquiry in any delegation challenge is 
whether Congress intended to permit the delegatee to delegate the authority conferred by 
Congress")).
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provided, however, that the private entities employ "pre-established objective criteria" to
determine who may participate. The court reasoned that:
[rjather than mandating a single set o f  "objective criteria" all staging organizations 
must follow, the FEC gave the individual organizations leeway to decide what 
specific criteria to use. (Citations omitted.) One might view this as a "delegation," 
because the organizations must use their discretion to formulate objective critena 
they think will conform with the agency's definition o f that term. But in that respect, 
virtually any regulation o f  a private party could be described as a "delegation" o f 
authority, since the party must normally exercise some discretion in interpreting what 
actions it must take to comply.
It does not follow, argued the court, that merely because the agency did not “spell out 
precisely” what the term “objective criteria” means, it unlawfully delegated its authority. In 
fact, the authority to determine what the term "objective criteria" means ultimately rests with 
the agency, and as such, the agency may determine, that a private parties criteria is not 
objective. Therefore, the court held that the agency did not unconstitutionally delegate 
legislative authority to private interests.
In fact, in Sierra Club v. Lynn,^^' the court found that “ [i]n the absence o f  bad faith 
or misplaced reliance, an agency faced with numerous applications for assistance and 
endowed with finite internal resources to implement congressional policy cannot be expected 
to ignore useful and relevant information merely because it emanates from an applicant.” 
However, the court emphasized, that this does not mean that an agency may substitute
111
:th502 F.2d 42 (5 ‘̂  Cir. 1974.)
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private entity 's “efforts and analysis” for its own.
It appears that the case law allows sub delegation o f  authorit} to pri\ ate sectors in 
cases where the agency retains final reviewing authority. Courts have interpreted the scope 
o f  final reviewing authority broadly. United B lack Fund, Inc. v. Hampton,^''^ outlines a 
standard o f  appropriate reviewing authority. The facts are these: Plaintiff, United Black 
Fund, is a nonprofit charitable corporation, which raises funds for local health and welfare 
agencies in inner-city Washington, D C. Plaintiff applied to the Chairman o f  the United 
States Civil Service Commission (“the Chairman” ) for solicitation privileges in the 
“Combined Federal Campaign,” an annual fund drive by several charities. The Chairman 
denied P la in tiff  s request, explaining that an Executive Order directed the Chairman o f the 
Civil Service Commission to make arrangements that would allow voluntary health and 
welfare agencies to solicit funds. Based on this Order, the Greater Washington Area was a 
"federated community," and as such, a federation o f  local voluntary agencies belonging to 
United Way o f  America, Inc. (“United W ay” ) was participating in the Campaign as an 
umbrella group. Local agencies wishing to receive funds from the drive, such as Plaintiff, 
may receive funds by applying to the Washington area united fund. Plaintiff filed suit, 
arguing that the Executive Order was an unlawful delegation o f  authority by the President 
o f  the United States.
112
Bee id. at 19 (citing United Black Fund. Inc. v. Hampton, 352 F. Supp. 898, 904 (D.D.C. 
1972)): /;.//. Vo/mLn Co. v. .SEC, 198 F.2d 690. 695 (2d Cir. 1952).
113
352 F. Supp. 898 (1972).
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The court rejected P la in tiffs  claim. It observed that the federal agency responsible
for local charitable organizations did not unlawfully delegate its authority to determine
charitable solicitation privileges because the agency retained sufficient oversight; it required
the private entities to meet independent federal standards such as nondiscrimination
standards."^ The court reasoned that:
Certainly it would be an abuse o f  discretion for the Chairman to surrender all 
authority over the policies o f  United Way and its member united funds and chests, 
but it seems clear from the record . . . that this is not the c a s e . . . [A]ll local agencies 
wishing to participate as members o f  a united fund or community chest in the 
Combined Federal Campaign must meet independent fed era l standards regarding  
such im portant matters as nondiscrimination standards, which are spelled out in the 
Chairman's Manual on Fund Raising. It is apparent . . . that the Chairman retains 
authority to review the policies even o f  those organizations which have been 
approved by United Way to make sure that they do in fact meet federal requirements. 
Final decision- making authority concerning eligibility o f  federations o f  local 
charities . . . does not, then, rest in a private organization.""
Interestingly, the court added that the Chairm an’s delegation was in fact 
advantageous for the federal agency: “ [The] Chaimian's "methods and standards" are not an 
abuse o f  discretion on any theory o f  invalid subdelegation and, . . . such methods and
114
See id. at 904-05.
115
Id. at 904; see also R. H. Johnson  Æ Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 198 
F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir.). cert, denied 344 U.S. 855 (1952) (subdelegation by federal 
agency to private entity is not invalid when the federal agency or official retains final 
reviewing authority); H arwell v. Growth Programs. Inc., 315 F.Supp. 1184, 1188 
(W.D.Tex. 1970) (same).
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standards are a reasonable means o f  permitting a great number o f  local volunteer health and 
welfare agencies to participate in the Combined Federal Campaign without unduly burdening 
the normal operations o f  the federal government.
More recently, two cases have addressed the extent to which federal agencies may 
delegate authority in the public lands arena. In both cases, the court rejected the 
governm ent’s delegation o f  authority, finding that it was too broad. In Natural Recourse 
D efense Council v. Model f  environmental and wildlife organizations claimed that the 
Bureau o f  Land Management (“BLM ” ) violated, among other statutes, the Taylor Grazing 
Act and FLPM A when it amended regulations for management o f  livestock grazing on 
public lands. At issue was the Secretary o f  the Interior's "Cooperative Management 
Agreements" (CMAs). Under the CMAs, the BLM  permits ranchers to graze livestock on 
the public lands in a way that the ranchers deem as appropriate. The court found that the 
CM A program “is contrary to Congressional intent and was enacted without proper regard 
for the possible environmental consequences which may result from overgrazing on the 
public lands.” "* Specifically, the court found that; “The CMA program disregards 
defendants' duty to prescribe the manner in and extent to which livestock practices will be 
conducted on public lands. The program also overlooks defendants' duty o f  expressly 
reserving, in all permits, sufficient authority to revise or cancel livestock grazing
I Ih
Id.
I 1 ^
618 F. Supp. 848 (E.D.Cal. 1985).
1 I K
Id.
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authorizations when nccessar>.’' " ‘̂ Interestingly, the court 's  reasoning highlights an
important policy concern underlying collaborative decision making:
the Congressional mandate that public lands be managed "in a manner that will 
protect the quality o f  scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and 
atmospheric, water resource, and archaeological values." . . . Some or all o f  these 
knowledgeable permittees may even be inclined to limit their livestock grazing to 
levels which will guarantee the vitality o f  such values, even at the expense o f  their 
own private ranching interests. Had Congress left a gap in its regulatory scheme 
which allowed defendants to decide whether individual ranchers should be entrusted 
with such decisions, this Court would be in no position to second guess the wisdom 
o f  the CMA program. However, Congress, in directing that the Secretary' prescribe 
the extent o f  livestock practices on each allotment, precluded such entrustment,....'*^
In the second and more recent ^ase. Naiional Park and CoNsen'ation Association  i'. 
Stantonk^^ the court squarely addresses the question o f  appropriate delegation o f  federal 
decision making to a local council. The next section discusses the court’s interpretation o f 
the unlawful sub delegation doctrine as it applied in National Park and C onsen’ation 
Association v. Stanton.
B. National Park and Conservation Association v, Stanton. 
The Unlawful Sub Delegation D octrine
11̂
Id.
12(1
Id.
1 2 1
54 F. Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 1999).
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The parameters o f  the unlawful sub delegation doctrine as it applied to local, 
collaborative decision making were tested in N ational Park and Consci'\'ation Association  
V. Stanton}-^ At issue was whether the National Park Service ("NFS") unlawfully 
delegated'"-’ its statutory duty to manage and administer the Niobrara National and Scenic 
River to a local private citizen group.
1. The Case
The Niobrara river, flowing through north central Nebraska, is home to several 
threatened and endangered species and is recognized as one o f  the premier canoeing rivers 
in the countiy.'-'' The Niobrara is also unique in that a majority o f  the river runs through 
private land. Against a backdrop o f  local opposition. Congress added sections o f  the river to 
the National Wild and Scenic Rivers system. As a wild and scenic river, the Niobrara falls 
within the National Park Service's jurisdiction.
122
54 F. Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 1999).
122
While courts generally refer to the doctrine as the unlawful sub delegation doctrine, the 
National Park and Conservation Ass'n court referred to it as the unlawful delegation tor 
simplicity purposes. See id. at 18.
124
See id. at 11.
125
Unless otherwise noted, the facts are taken from National Park and Conservation Ass'n. 
V. Stanton. 54 F. Supp. 2d. 7 (D.D.C. 1999).
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The management regime for the Niobrara river evolved out o f  a complex process. 
Congress first created an eleven member advisor)' commission made up o f  local interests. 
Congress’s intent in forming the advisory commission was to ease local hostility to the 
Niobrara's designation by encouraging local and state involvement in designing a general 
management plan for the river. With the help o f  the advisor)' commission, the NPS 
developed a General Management Plan and Environmental Impact Statement (GMP/EIS). 
The GMP framed the N PS’s management objectives for the Niobrara river and the EIS 
outlined several management alternatives. The NPS eventually chose an alternative 
(“Alternative B ”) that required a two step approach to management o f  the river. First, in July 
1997, the NPS entered into an Interlocal Cooperative Agreement (“the Agreement”) with 
local Nebraska government entities. The Agreement then created the Niobrara Council (“the 
Council” ), made up o f  members o f  county and state agencies, local landowners, a 
representative from the timber and recreational businesses and Fish and Wildlife Service, and 
one representative o f  the NPS. The Council was responsible for managing and protecting the 
Niobrara River according to the standards outlined in the GMP/EIS. The NPS retained 
authority to terminate both the Council as well as the Agreement if  the Council failed to meet 
established objectives or i f  it managed the river in a way inconsistent \\ ith NPS national 
environmental standards.
Plaintiffs National Parks and Conservation, Barr)' Harper, and the American Canoe 
Association alleged that almost two years had passed since the NPS created the Council but 
the group had yet to provide a management plan to protect Niobrara’s resources.
34
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2. Analysis
Plaintiffs alleged, among other issues, that the NPS unlawfully delegated its 
management authority to the Council.
(a) NPS' Statutory Obligations
The court initially addresses the N PS' statutory obligations. It recognized that the 
N P S ’ mission is "to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild 
life therein and to provide for the enjoyment o f  the same in such manner and by such means 
as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment o f  future generations.'” ''’
The duties o f  the Secretary o f  the Interior are explained in 16 U.S.C. § 1281(c)
(1999):
The Secretary o f  the Interior, in his administration o f  any component o f  the national 
wild and scenic rivers system, may utilize such general statutory authorities relating 
to areas o f  the national park system and such general statutory authorities otherwise 
available to him for recreation and preservation purposes and for the conservation 
and management o f  natural resources as he deems appropriate to carry out the 
purposes o f  this chapter.''*’
Almost fifty years after Congress created the NPS, Congress passed the Wild and
1:6
National Park Ser\'ice Organic Act, 16 U.S.C.  ̂ 1 (1999).
1:7
Id. (emphasis added).
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Scenic Rivers Act in 1968 to "preser\'e [the] selected rivers or sections thereof in their 
free-flowing condition to protect the water quality o f  such rivers and to fulfill other \ ital 
national conservation purposes".
(b) Advisory Commission
The court recognized that the advisory commission, designed and implemented by 
Congress, was a lawful extension ofthe  NFS's a u t h o r i t y .T h e  court reasoned that Congress 
knew that a majority o f  the land included in the Niobrara river system was pri\ately  owned, 
and created the commission to encourage local participation in managing the river. Congress 
did not intend to wholly shift the NFS's management responsibilities to a private entity such 
as the Council.'-" The court rejected the N FS’s claim that, similar to the advisory committee, 
the Council also fell within the scope o f  acceptable subdelegation o f  authority.'^'
(c) the Council
16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1999).
124
See N ational Park and  Conservation Ass'n. 54 F. Supp. 2d at 18.
Uti
See id.
1 3 1
See id. at 20-21.
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The court then addressed whether the Council, similar to the Advisor)' Commission, 
was an abrogation o f  the Secretary’s duties. Applying this statutory' language to the case 
here, the court first addressed the constitutionality o f  the Advisory Committee. The court 
found that the “statutes give the Secretary o f  the Interior sole responsibility for 
adm inistering  the lands included in the National Parks system and the National Wild and 
Scenic Rivers system.” emphasis added. The court then interpreted"administering," as 
used in the statute, to mean "to manage ... to direct or superintend the execution, use, or 
conduct o f . . .  to manage or conduct affairs. Thus, the Secretary, who is statutorily charged 
with administering Park Ser\'ice lands and rivers, “cannot wholly delegate his 
responsibility to a local entity which is not bound by the statutory obligations set forth 
above.” The court reasoned that: “NPS cannot, under the unlawful delegation doctrine, 
completely shift its responsibility to administer the Niobrara to a private actor, (citation 
omitted), particularly a private actor whose objectivity may be questioned on grounds o f  
conflict o f  interest.” According to the court:
Plaintiffs argue that Congress created the Advisory Commission as the "primary 
channel" for local input regarding the administration o f th e  Niobrara, and that the 
creation o f  a local managing council violates the intent o f  Congress. . . . [T]he 
Advisory Commission's recommendation for the creation o f  a local council can not 
shield NPS from the finding that by follow ing that recommendation it may ha\ e 
unlawfully delegated its duties to the council.'- '
I . - :
N ational Park and Conservation Ass'n, 54 F.Supp. 2d
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As stated previously, the threshold inquir>' to determine whether an agency
unconstitutionally delegated its authority, is whether "Congress intended to permit the
delegatee to delegate the authority conferred by Congress." The court found no indication
in either statutes or the legislative history that Congress “ intended any \ ariation on the
doctrine o f  unlawful delegation.” ^
However, because case law allows an agency to delegate its authority if  it retains
reviewing authority, the next question is whether the NPS retained sufficient final
reviewing authority over the Council. According to management documents, including
Alternative B, the Niobrara is to be managed by a local council, with NPS merely
serving as liaison and pro\ iding technical support as needed. (Citations omitted.) The 
Council is responsible far hiring staff, monitoring the River resources, evaluating 
access sites and land protection needs, providing educational and information 
services, providing law enforcement and emergency services, and maintaining roads, 
bridges, and other river access sites.
The court found that these duties “fall squarely within the Secretary's responsibilities for
managing the Niobrara.
Moreover, under the management guidelines, “the Council is encouraged to seek
13. '
Id.
s:.4
Id
135
Id.
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outside sources o f  funding to avoid having its decisions "dictated". . . NPS has only one 
voting member on the Council, and all decisions are made by majority vote.” The court 
found that; “In short, it is clear that NPS retains virtually no final authority over the 
actions—or inaction—o f  the Council.
Therefore, the court held that the N PS’s delegation o f  its statutory management 
duties to the Council violated the unlawful delegation doctrine. Specifically, the court 
found that:
the NPS retained no oversight over the Council, no final reviewing authority over the 
council's actions or inaction, and the Council's dominant private local interests are 
likely to conflict with the national environmental interests that NPS is statutorily 
mandated to represent. NPS lacks the authority to: appoint or remove members o f th e  
Council, aside from its own representative; determine which interests will be 
represented: select Council officers; establish Council sub-committees; determine the 
term limit for Council members; veto Council decisions which are contrary to the 
GMP; independently review Council decisions prior to implementation; and control 
Council funding. . . [Tjhe Council does not share NPS' national vision and 
perspective. NPS controls only one o f th e  15 Council members, and is the only 
member, besides FWS, who represents national environmental concerns.'^'
Finally, although the court recognized that the NPS retained authority to dismantle 
the Council completely if  it failed to manage the Niobrara consistent with the plans 
outlined in GMP, the court argued that “[u]se o f  such a draconian weapon is highly
IjCi
Id.
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Id.
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unlikely, especially since NPS claims that without local participation, it could not 
effectively meet its goals and objectives because o f  local opposition to federal 
management."
While the court in National Park and C onsen’ation Association  v, Stanton rejected 
the NPS decision to delegate its authority to a local council, Congress took an opposite 
approach when it legislated the Quincy Library Group. The next section discusses 
Congress' mandate that the Forest Service implement a locally developed management 
proposal for a large area o f  national forest land in the northern Sierra Nevada Mountains.
C. The Quincy L ibra iy  Group: Congressional Legislation  
o f  a Citizen Initiated M anagement Plan
In October 21,1998, less than a year before the district court decided Stanton, Congress 
passed the “Herger-Feinstein Quincy Librar}' Group Forest Recovery Act (“the Act”), ” a 
locally designed proposal for managing 2.5 million acres o f  national forest land in the 
northern Sierra Nevada M ountains.'-’ Congress passed the Act as part o f the  Department o f  
the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act.'"*" The Act requires the Forest Service 
to implement a locally developed management plan for an area o f  land covering the entire
IJ..S
Id
See Cestero, supra  note 2, at 5.
I4fi
See Cestero, supra  note 2. at 5.
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Plumas and Lassen National Forests and the Sierraville District o f  the Tahoe National 
Forest.
The Act was a product o f  the Quincy Library' Group ("QLG"), a local citizen group 
initially organized by a timber industry forester, a county supervisor, and an environmental 
attorney who wanted to tackle the contentious environment in Quincy, California brought 
on by the timber wars o f  the early 1990’s .‘‘̂’ The "timber w ars 'w ere  the result o f  dramatic 
changes in timber harvest levels in Lassen and Plumas counties, and surrounding areas, 
combined with an increased environmental awareness. The controversy was also fueled by 
concerns over the extinction o f  the California spotted owl. By 1993, the QLG had developed 
a “Community Stability Proposal,” which included recommendations for maintaining a
141
See Cestero, supra  note 2, at 5.
See id  By 1999, timber production from QLG national forests was barely 10% o fth e  
1980’s levels. A sharp decline in timber-related economic activity and employment 
coincided with the declining harvest levels. According to a QLG case study:
the Forest Service found itself in a dilemma. On one hand, each forest had only 
recently adopted a Land and Resource Management Plan (LRMP) that called for 
high timber production . . . and “timber people” felt they were entitled to the 
production levels described in those plans. On the other hand . . . 
“environmentalists” demanded immediate action to protect spotted owls and other 
species reported to be at risk, and to preserve large old trees and roadless areas. 
These contrary views expressed themselves during a two or three year period in a 
sequence o f  charges and counter-charges involving sabotage and tree-spiking, 
demonstrations and counter- demonstrations, and even direct threats o f  injury or 
death.
Engaging, Empowering, and Negotiating Community: Strategies fo r  Consciwation and  
Development., The Conservation and Development Forum. West Virginia University, and 
the Center for Economic Options. October 8-10, 1998.
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consistent timber supply, implementing an experimental fire control scheme, and designating 
roadless and riparian areas excluded from timber harvesting.''^- H ow e\er, after waiting tor 
almost four years for the Forest Service to implement the plan without any results, the QLG 
bypassed the agency and took its proposal to Congress.'"" The House o f Representatives 
passed the proposal by a vote o f  429 to The bill initially died in the Senate after 
confronting opposition from 140 environmental groups but eventually passed in October 
1999 as a rider to the Omnibus appropriations bill and was never debated on the floor o f  the 
Senate."^
The Act directs the Secretary o f  Agrieulture, acting through the Forest Service, to 
conduct a 5-year pilot project to implement resource protection and management activities 
outlined by the QLG on the Plumas, Lassen, and Tahoe National Forests. The Pilot Project 
focuses on the advantages o f  fuel breaks, group selection, individual tree selection, avoidance 
or protection o f  specified areas, and riparian restoration. Specifically, the project ( 1 ) required 
40,000 to 60,000 acres o f  strategic fuel reduction (harvesting o f  dead and diseased trees) in 
fire prone areas each year; (2) required special efforts to protect riparian areas including 
creation o f  wide protection zones; (3) required selective harv esting techniques to achieve
IJ3
See Cestero. supra  note 2, at 5.
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multi age, multi-story, varied species forest: and (4) banned all logging in certain 
environmentally-sensitive areas.
The legislation also explicitly states that “ [njothing in this section exempts the pilot 
project from any Federal environmental law.” As such, the Forest Service is required to 
complete an env ironmental impact statement to analyze the effects o f  the management 
proposals before it implements any management activities.
The QLG has generated considerable controversy,'"*' and because o f  this it is difficult 
to disentangle the conflicting stories surrounding both the crafting o f  the legislation and its 
implications. However, it appears clear that the QLG closed meetings that at one time had 
been open to the public. The Group also excluded interested stakeholders, most notably the 
Forest Service, as well as several local and national environmental groups involved in the 
region's forest management issues.'"*'* Without the input o f  the diverse, and often, opposing 
views, opponents characterize QLG as a ‘“collaborative advocacy group,”"''® more concerned 
with lobbying for congressional support than with being inclusive o f all affected interests.'" 
Still others accuse the coalition o f  advancing the Sierra Pacific Industries timber company
147
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See Cestero, supra  note 2, at 76.
I4W
See Cestero. supra  note 2, at 77.
I.VJ
See Cestero, supra  note 2. at 76.
151
See Cestero, supra  note 2. at 76.
43
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
agenda at the expense o f  local needs,'-- and they have condemned the proposal as "'another 
sweetheart deal for California's largest timber company.”'
It is argued that large timber companies support the Act because o f  the degree o f 
certainty it provides; permitting timber harc esting without the legal challenges and appeals 
from environmentalists. Some local environmentalists support the Act because it ensures 
environmental restrictions that may not have been possible. However, support is not 
universal. Ranchers do not view the QLG as representative o f  local interest. They oppose 
the Act because according to one spokesperson, “it appears to grant the Forest Service 
sweeping new authority to violate established water rights and to limit or even terminate 
grazing within the pilot project area during the term o f  the program.” National 
environmental interests are skeptical as well; how representative o f  the national interest is 
a local movement? The QLG is an often cited example o f  both the benefits and pitfalls of 
collaboration. And while it may be redundant to add to this discussion, it is important 
nonetheless, for the very reason that QLG has garnered so much attention: despite one’s 
opinion o f  the QLG and i t ’s legislation, it represents a major shift in the way public lands 
have traditionally been managed.
u:
See Cestero, supra  note 2, at 76.
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IV. The Future o f  Collaborative Decision Making and 
the Scope o f  Its Authority on Public Lands
Throughout the history o f the West, westerners have often sanctioned environmentally 
destructive and economically untenable solutions to the question o f  who should control 
natural resources.'^’ Therefore, because o f  this history, a collaborative decision making 
process driven by local participation should be approached cautiously.'^- The parameters o f  
collaborative decision making must be well defined both in terms o f  what is legally 
appropriate and politically acceptable.
This section discusses the positive role o f  collaboration as a tool to address natural 
resources decision making while acknowledging the potential challenges collaborative 
groups may encounter. Although these ideas are not new,''*’ they provide the political 
framework necessary for understanding the influence and ramifications o f  collaborative 
decision making. Following this discussion, this section then analyzes the limited and 
conflicting legal boundaries o f  collaboration. Finally, this section concludes by advocating 
a formal process for collaboration efforts on public lands, based on the Forest Service
''LSee Coggins, supra  note 15. at 604. 
Snow, supra  note 5. at 2.
15(>
See generally  The Next West, supra  note 1 (discussing changes in western politics, 
demographics and economy); Cestero. supra  note 2 (discussing collaboration on public 
lands); A W olf in the Garden: The land Rights Movement and the New Environmental 
Debate (Philip D. Brick & Cawle} R. McGreggor eds.) (1996) (discussing changes in 
public land management in the West).
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proposed rules. After almost a decade o f  ad hoc collaborative efforts across the West, ' this 
proposal provides a structure that separates the good from the bad, the tiaily collaborati\ e. 
democratic decision making from the attempts to assert fractious local control under the 
guise o f  collaboration.
A. Collaboration on Public Lands:
Current Opportunities for Public Participation
Collaboration has the potential to play a positive role in expanding the parameters o f  
natural resource decision making. First, collaboration provides an opportunity to perform 
politics more effectively.'^* That is, despite the hopes o f  Progressive Era conservationists, 
decisions regarding natural resources are highly political—the majority o f  laws created to 
manage public lands foster politicized decision making.’"̂  Instead o f  trying to remove 
politics from the decision making process, collaborative decision making attempts to 
improve politics. ' Collaborative groups become political structures that are more responsive
157
See The Next West, supra  note 1, at 186.
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and able to integrate local i n t e r e s t s . I n  this way, collaborative decision making offers 
opportunities to experiment with a revival o f  Jeffersonian democracy,"’- in which citizens 
negotiate face-to-face for solutions that affect them directly."’-' Unlike "remote-control 
governance,”"’’̂ collaborative decision making provides accountability;"’- local westerners 
become responsible for the decisions they make about the lands and resources in their 
communities."’*' The result is, therefore, not anti-government but instead, a more democratic 
approach to federal decision m aking ." '
Furthermore, the sense o f  local responsibility that collaborative groups foster may prove 
more effective at resolving public land issues commonly left to the agencies. While many 
o f  the more intractable issues such as mining are probably beyond the scope o f
Inl
See The New West, supra  note 1. at 186.
16:
See The New West, supra  note 1, at 185.
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See generally  Daniel Kenimis. Community and the Politics o f  Place 113 (1990) 
(analyzing revi\a l o f  Jeffersonian democracy).
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collaboration,'^^ issues that are likely to gather widespread support, such as improving fish 
habitat, are more appropriate for collaborative decision making. Therefore, w hen opposing 
interests, joining together around a common desire, negotiate individual demands into a 
workable agreement, they create a powerful coalition.'**' As these groups maneuver their way 
through the negotiation process, “they overcome residual opposition through the politics o f 
inclusion."'^* Divisiveness is more likely integrated into the decision making process. ' '  This 
suggests that agreements developed by collaborative groups may be acceptable to a majority 
o f  the interested parties and less likely to encounter opposition.
Even in situations where collaboration fails to produce a tangible product, the effort is 
worthwhile because collaboration, when done correctly, builds community bonds and lays 
the foundation for future problem solving.'^- These successes are well documented and their 
impacts should not be underestimated.’'  ̂ The process o f  working together on a common
1 6 S
See Snow, supra  5. at 8.
I A4
See The New West, supra  note 1, at 195.
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The N ew  West, supra  note 1, at 196.
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lands); A W olf in the Garden, supra  note 156 (discussing changes in public land 
management in West).
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issue may foster trust and understanding among citizens who have traditionally remained 
alienated, particularly in communities where resource extraction dominates the local 
economy.''^ The result is a situation that is more likely to promote, rather than discourage, 
dialogue, and in the future may lead to tangible problem solving on difficult issues. While 
the Quincy Library Group fails to provide a workable model for collaborative decision 
making, critics applaud the group for its success in mending some o f  the divisiveness that 
plagued the community in the early 1990s.'^‘’
Most importantly, collaborative decision making has gathered such momentum that it 
is unlikely to fade from the political landscape in the near future. Since the early 1990s, 
collaborative groups have ballooned, and arguably, collaborative decision making has 
gathered enough widespread support that it constitutes a new environmental m o v em en t. ' '' 
Nationally, collaborative decision making is heralded as a solution for addressing difficult 
resource allocation questions.'"  Even if  national politics turned against collaboration, it is 
unlikely that these efforts would dissolve. Having given local citizens increased influence 
over participation in the decision making process, federal land management agencies risk
174
See id.
175
See Quincy Librar>' Group Forest Recovery and Economics Stability Act o f  1997: 
Hearings on H R. 858 Before the Sub Comm, on Fore.st and Forest Health o f the Comm, 
on Resources, 105th Cong. 44. 4? (1997) (statement o f  Louis Blum berg) [hereinafter 
Blumberg].
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disenfranchising these groups by withdrawing support. Because oscillations o f  western anger 
directed at the federal government have dominated public land politics since the turn o f  the 
century/"* this is an outcome the federal government should not risk.'"''
However, challenges to collaborative decision making do exist. George Coggins 
highlights three major concerns. First, collaboration is susceptible to co-option by powerful 
interest groups.'*" Second, collaboration agreements may contradict national priorities.'*' 
Third. Coggins is reluctant to trust local westerners to do the right thing if  given expanded 
influence over decision making.'*" Coggins argues that “[fjrom the birth of the Nation, local 
citizens have banded together, usually at the expense o f  the general public and often with the
178
See generally  A W olf in the Garden, supra  note 156 (discussing changes in public land 
management in West): Cawley R. McGreggor, Federal Land. Western Anger; The 
Sagebrush Rebellion and Environmental Politics (1993) (discussing histor>' o f  anti-federal 
sentiment in West).
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In each o f  these "movements." western interest groups sought to obstruct federal 
management o f  public resources by asserting local control. While these "movements" 
eventually dissolved, they succeeded in disrupting management o f  natural resources and 
fueling anti-federalist sentiment. See generally A W olf in the Garden, supra note 151 
(discussing changes in public land management in West); Cawley R. McGreggor. Federal 
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connivance o f  federal and local officials, Therefore, while positi \e  outcomes may result 
from collaborative decision making, collaborative groups, unchecked, ha\ e the potential to 
frustrate their primary^ objectives by encouraging local control instead o f  local participation. 
Consequently, formalizing the collaborative process through agency regulations provides the 
safeguards against these concerns while also encouraging the flexibility and creativity that 
fueled collaborative decision making initially.
B. H ow M uch Is Enough ? D efining the Legal Boundaries 
o f  Collaborative Decision M aking Authority
As this Paper suggests, collaborative decision making is a recent phenomenon and runs 
counter to public land law and custom and, thus, its legal boundaries remain u n c l e a r . T h i s  
section analyzes the contradicting precedents outlined in the previous section.
I. The Quincy L ihra iy  Group
There is no doubt that Congress has the authority to legislate the Quincy Library Group 
(“Q LG ”). But is legislating a locally-driven proposal, such as the QLG proposal, to manage
I . S 3
See Coggins, supra  note 15. at 603.
1 8 4
See supra  Part II and III.
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huge tracts o f  land a good idea from both a resource management and collaborative decision 
making perspective? This Paper argues that Congress’ decision to implement the QLG's 
proposal, and in so doing, working outside o f  existing public land laws and regulations, 
establishes an unacceptable precedent. In codifying the QLG proposal. Congress suspended 
both the National Forest Management Act (“N FM A ”) and the National Environmental 
Protection Act (“N EPA ”).'^- As one practioner observed, “ [t]his case demonstrates most 
clearly that these consensus processes are designed to be implemented; they are not input.
. . . they are intended to shape policy.” '**’
(a) Piece-m eal approach
The QLG sets the precedent that collaborative groups may accomplish through 
congressional legislation what they could not achieve under existing public land laws. The 
QLG model, thus, allows citizen groups to bypass public land laws that stand in the way of 
their proposal, at least at the initial stages. This critique highlights a critical aspect o f  
collaborative decision making: it must be integrated into the current public participation 
process, and should not replace existing regulations and laws.'*'’
supra  Part III.
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The QLG highlights a critical problem with collaborative decision m aking-piece 
meal approach to resource management. By legislating the QLG proposal. Congress allow s 
a local group o f  citizens to make decisions about a specific area, and the likely result is a lack 
o f  consistency in how public lands and resources are managed. John Leshy, Professor of 
Law at Arizona State University and former Solicitor o f  the U.S. Department o f  the Interior, 
expressed his concern with this approach recently:
One question is how strong is the value o f  having some uniformity and 
consistency o f  management across an entire national system o f  lands 
(e.g.. national forests, national parks) by a single institution (the U.S. Forest Seiwice; 
the National Park Service), and how big a threat to that value is the fragmentation 
inherent in these arrangements. And how strong is the competing value o f  
experimenting with different management models, and in giving institutions 
like the U.S. Forest Service and National Park Sendee some competition 
in how units o f  their systems are managed?
At the root o f  this concern is whether these piecemeal approaches fragment uniform 
control, and moreover, prevent compliance or coordination with broader management plans 
at the large ecosystem level. “ Such a devolutionary approach faces a number o f  potentially 
vexing problems, perhaps most notably those associated with . . . adequate attention to the 
regional dimension o f  environmental problems Environmentalists also have echoed
I XX
John Leshy, Public Lands, The American Law Institute, February' 13-15, 2002.
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this concern; they fear that Q L G ’s decision to lobby Congress and avoid Forest Service 
participation in the management plan creates a “precedent o f  piecemeal legislation for 
individual forests that would inevitably lead to the o\ er-riding o f  environmental law s ” '’'"
W hile critics o f  the current resource management system argue that de-centralized 
decision making is c r i t i c a l , n a t i o n a l  environmental and ecological concerns should provide 
an overarching framework to any decentralized refonn. Congressionally mandated 
collaborative efforts are especially problematic for the National Park Service because o f  the 
unique language contained in the National Park Service Organic Act o f  1916,'’- the 
authorizing statute for the National Park Service.'"- Because the Act authorizes individual 
parks separately,” '’ the QLG approach, unfettered, could lead to a series o f  individually 
managed parks, limiting, beyond what is desirable, a uniform, national policy for managing 
national parks.
This is not an isolated concern. One legal scholar warned against any efforts by
and  (he D evolution o f  U.S. Federal Environmental Programs, Natural Resource Journal, 
2000 .
I VO
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Congress to allow local communities “to have either nominal or o\'ert control over park 
policies.’’ As an example, he cited a congressional proposal in 1996, which created an 
eleven-member intergovernmental council to make management recommendations for 
Voyageurs National Park. The NPS would be allowed only one representative on a council 
made up largely o f  local and state officials. In the end, Congress did not enact the 
legislation, principally, because: “ [ojpponents o f  the plan voiced concerns that a delegation 
controlled by local officials would likely allow increased recreational use o f  the park, which 
would, in their estimation, compromise the environmental integnty o f  the park.” ''̂ -
(b) N ational Participation
From the standpoint o fnon-local populations, oftentimes an environmental decision has 
regional or national implieations, either because the decision directly affects an 
environm ental resource that a wide range o f  non-local stakeholders perceive as a 
national good, or because the decision indirectly shapes decisions about other resources 
in non-local areas.
Politically, the QLG model is unsupportable. The QLG proposal represents local control 
instead o f  collaboration between local, regional, and national interests. While the difference 
is subtle, it is important. By excluding interests groups that may have been unwilling to
1V5
Richard J. Ansson, Jr., Funding Our National Parks in the 2P ' Centiny: Will If e Be .ible  
to P resen 'c  and Protect Our Em battled N ational Parks / .  Fordham Environmental Law 
Journal, Fall 1999.
Kris W emstedt, Terra Firma or Terra Incognita'.'' Western Land Use, Hazardous If asfe. 
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support the proposal, QLG violates a fundamental principle o f  public land and resource 
management. The evolution o f  public land law has created a system in which the remaining 
federal lands are so sufficiently valuable that they should remain under federal management 
and, as such, must consider national interests. Consequently, planning on federal lands must 
embrace more than just local opinion; the allocation o f  national resources is not a singularly 
local issue.
This criticism raises another major concern that emerges from the QLG; how to ensure 
broad stakeholder participation, specifically, national environmental representation. 
Arguably, the lack o f  participation by national environmental groups and federal agencies, 
either because they were not invited or chose not to attend, had the dual effect of 
consolidating national policy v, ith a few local people while at the same time increasing the 
control o f  those interest such as industry, that are welcome to p a r t i c i p a t e . A t  the very- 
least, limiting representation may re-distribute negotiating power between environmentalists 
and industry. Worse, it may disenfranchise interests, such as the national environmental 
groups, that do not participate.
It is well documented that larger enviromnental groups view collaboration with 
suspicion.” * Central to their concerns is, who speaks for the national environmental
1V7
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interest? As one environmentalist observ ed:
Spokespersons for the relevant national groups might be appointed, but it would not be 
convenient or economically feasible for them to attend frequent meetings in far-off 
places. Surrogates might also be chosen from among local sympathizers, but how can 
they be legitimated as representatives in fact? The national groups might not agree that 
they will faithfully represent their interests. In many cases, only a limited portion o f  the 
interested parties will reside in the locality involved.
The result that emerges is a power shift; disenfranchisement o f  urban constituency, who 
like their local counterparts, recreate and appreciate public lands, in favor o f  local interests. 
Similarly, as one critic observed, the potential exists that the economic interests o f  the 
citizens closest to the land or resource at issue would be preferenced over the non-economic 
interest o f  urban interest groups. Public lands are still public, QLG is a power shift that is 
legally and culturally unsupportable.
By limiting participation, the QLG created an unequal distribution o f  negotiating power 
that favored industry over resource, land, and species protection. In fact, it is argued that 
local groups such as the QLG
provide[] industry factions with yet another arena in which to assert their interests. 
According to critics, such groups provide industry organizations with a means o f 
avoiding the costs and rigors o f  national lobbying and negotiating by giving them 
access to more easily controlled local forums. This, in tutn, results in an easily
!94
Id.
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exploited means o f  promoting the interests at the expense o f  the environment.-'
Compounding this fear, is the concern that small environmental groups may not be able 
to sufficiently represent national concerns, particularly because they have less resources than 
many o f  the other stakeholders. And the effect than may be reduced negotiating power. Or 
alternatively, local groups may be influenced by the majoritarian views o f  the local 
community where they live, particularly because many western communities are still 
dependant on the revenues that flow from resource industries.
The presence o f  strong government participation-in the form o f  agency 
representation-has been suggested as one solution. As one advocate argued, federal agency 
representations “will be essential in achieving a balance between concerned parties and 
ensuring that all interested stakeholders are invited to the negotiating table, preventing well- 
entrenched groups from abusing the collaborative decision-making process.” However, this 
solution is flawed as well. According to David H. Getches, Professor o f  Natural Resources 
Law at the University o f  Colorado School o f Law, “federal agencies are supposed to enforce 
the laws rather than facilitate compromise. When a federal agency plays the role o f  a 
facilitator, it can blur the bright line o f  what should and should not be permitted under 
federal law.”-̂ " Furthermore, federal agencies have often failed to fulfill their role as neutral
Matthew Schuckman, M aking the H ard Choices: A Collaborative Governance M odel fo r  
the B iodiversity Cotxtext. Washington University Law Quarterly, Spring 2001.
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participants concerned with safeguarding national interests. As such, unlike what happened 
in the QLG, agencies must be required to participate. However, this argument is flaw ed. 
Federal resource agencies have often failed to demonstrate a commitment to national or 
often, ecological concerns.
More importantly, compliance with NEPA may provide the most effective answer to 
ensuring broad national participation. If, in fact, the QLG proposal must survive an HIS 
analysis before the Forest Servdce implements the management guidelines, the possibility for 
broad, national input exists during the comment and appeal stages. However, even this 
outcome has its limitations. If, as discussed previously in the NEPA section, the law only 
requires the agencies to consider, but not necessarily implement public input, reviewing 
agency decisions by national interests may not be enough.
(c) Agency Participation
Congressional legislation o f  the Q L G ’s proposal acts as a revocation o f Congress’ 
delegation o f  authority to federal land management agencies. Under the QLG approach. 
Congress creates a system in which it, and not the trained professionals, manage a small area 
o f  land almost 2,000 miles away from Washington D C. The repercussions o f  this decision 
are huge. Congressionally mandated management may transform federal agencies into 
passive participants on public lands rather than driving forces behind policy and regulations.
Locctl D ecisions Eclipsed the States 'Rule?, Stanford Enxironmental Law Journal 
January', 2001.
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While the QLG excluded the Forest Serv ice entirely, even collaboratives that allow agencies 
to participate equally with other stakeholders may be problematic for the reasons addressed 
above. The flip side to this, however, may be appealing to politicians. Limited involvement 
by agencies absolves politicians from having to resolve contentious environmental issues, 
as was the case with the QLG and the spotted owl, by simply deferring to citizens to find a 
solution. In effect, the QLG provided "an easy way out." Based on this observation, QLG 
emerged as a politically expandable opportunity for politicians to defer extremely difficult 
decisions over the tension between spotted owl extinction and timber harvesting to a group 
o f  local citizens.
Alternatively, by excluding the Forest Service, the QLG suggests that government is 
simply another stakeholder, and “not the body that represents all stakeholders,... an absence 
o f  distinctive expertise in both agencies and government and that more expertise resides in 
casually assembled groups o f  stakeholders.” Most significantly, non-participation by the 
Forest service suggests that local citizens felt that “while the government may still have 
power to enforce a decision, it lacks any special legitimacy to make decisions. Apparently, 
government is no longer viewed as having any right to exercise authority by virtue o f the 
democratic process that chooses the office holders who direct government.”'"'
(d) Failure o f  Democracy
Lastly, the QLG may represent what one national environmentalist described as a failure
Michael Mccloskey, Problem s with Using Collaboration to Shape Environmental Public 
Policv, Valparaiso University Law Review, Spring, 2000.
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o f  democracy. Although an in depth analysis o f  this notion is beyond the scope o f  the Paper, 
a brief discussion is important. As such, one critic o f  collaborative decision making 
observed that:
trying to achieve representation through service on a negotiating group, rather than 
through the electorate and representative institutions, also poses problems. Most 
theorists agree that all stakeholders with a real interest in the outcome ought to be 
members o f  the group. But institutions o f  representative democracy provide many more 
nuanced opportunities for various interests to be heard and exert influence, particularly 
through opportunities to form alliances in the electoral and lobbying processes. It is 
simply not mechanically feasible to bring that many voices to the table in a collaborative 
exercise. These exercises need to be o f  a workable size. Thus, in practice, fewer voices 
can be heard.
Interestingly, critics o f  that the QLG approach, and collaboration generally, who fear 
that these efforts bypass the democratic process, often focus on concerns that collaboration 
disenfranchises national interests. Similar to the arguments stated above in the discussion o f 
national representation, one opponent expressed concern that: “Instead o f issues being 
decided by majorities or pluralities in a nationwide constituency, decisions would be made 
in the context o f  small, dispersed constituencies."'"'^ And furthermore, “ [tjhe power o f  such 
constituencies would not be limited to local issues. Issues o f  broader import would be subj ect
:i)5
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to the local communities' decisions.
Lastiy, it is worth noting that the inherent conflict o f  democracy may be advantageous 
to environmental decision making. It has been argued that: “Full-throated debate develops 
and focuses issues, generates interest in them, educates the public, and creates the will to find 
solutions. . . .We do not need a tool to suppress such conflict.
Although this analysis is not entirely supportable, it raises some troubling concerns 
about the QLG approach.
2. National Park and Conservation Association v. Stanton
The court in N ational Park and Conscn'arwn Association  v. Stanton restricted 
collaborative decision unduly tlrrough its interpretation o f  the unlawful sub delegation 
doctrine. By rejecting the National Park Service’s ("NPS") authority to delegate its authority 
because it did not retain significant oversight, the court’s holding is inconsistent with the case 
law. In United B lack Fund. Inc. v. Hampton,-'^'’ the court agreed that the Chairman o f the U.S. 
Civil Service Commission did not violate the unlawful sub delegation doctrine even though 
the Com m ission’s reviewing authority was limited to ensuring that the pri\ate citizens’
:ri5
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-̂ '’See U nited Black Fund, Inc. v. Hampton.. 352 F. Supp. 898 (1972).
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council complied with broad federal regulations.-"" The court did not seem to be concerned 
that the citizens operated without significant oversight from the federal agency.-"'' Therefore, 
applying this holding to the facts in Stanton, the court incorrectly held that the NPS 
unlawfully delegated its authority. Similar to the commission in United Black Fund, the NPS 
retained oversight o f  the Council; the NPS oversaw the Council’s compliance with the 
federal standards outlined in the GMP/EIS and retained the authority to dismantle the 
Council i f  it failed to meet these requirements. Therefore, the Council operated within 
national environmental and land use planning laws. While this oversight is extremely 
limited, it falls within the broad parameters outlined in the case law.
Politically, the court’s decision is unacceptable as well. A majority o f  collaborativ e 
groups operate outside o f  the federal agency’s oversight.-'" Commonly, federal agents act as 
participants with equal voting rights as citizens, other agencies, and local government 
officials. Generally, citizens structure the proposals and dictate the agenda to reflect 
participants’ interests. Therefore, applying the National Park and C onsen’ation court’s 
requirements that agencies avoid violation o f  the unlawful sub delegation doctrine by 
significantly increasing their involvement in collaborative groups is likely to diminish the
206
See id. at 904.
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the early 1990's and works independently o f any federal agency. See Cestero. supra note
2. at 5.
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enthusiasm for, and amount of, collaboration efforts. Agencies cannot afford the time and 
money it would take to participate at the level the court requires. Furthermore, it is probable 
that local participants will resent the paternalistic role the Stanton  court's holding forces on 
the agencies—collaboration grew out o f  a desire to work outside o f  traditional decision 
making schemes in which citizens, and not federal agents, directed the process. Therefore, 
to create a framework based on the court’s holding tlireatens to circum\ ent reform that 
collaborative decision making attempts to provide. Agency oversight is significant at the 
implementing stage o f  a citizen proposal. That is, the agency must retain authority to reject 
the citizen driven proposal; oversight is extended too far if  it demands more than that.
However, the council pushes the boundaries o f  collaboration extremely close to local 
control. By excluding representatives from national organizations with interests in the 
Niabrara River, it is less likely that the council will adequately represent national concerns 
in its management decisions. Because the Niabrara is part o f  the federal land system, this 
outcome is unacceptable. Nationally held lands cannot be managed by local control only. 
Therefore, some aspects o f  the council provide a workable model for collaborative decision 
making; the council operates within federal laws and the NPS retains the discretion to 
terminate the council i f  it acts inconsistently with national conser\'ation standards. However, 
the council’s reliance on local participation falls short o f  a successful collaboration by failing 
to adequately represent national interests.-" At the ver>' least, a stronger federal agency
Richard J. Ansson, Jr., Funding Our National Parks in the 21"' Century: Will Jf'c Be Able 
to P resen 'e  and  Protect Our Em battled National P a r k s Fordham Environmental Law 
Journal, Fall 1999.
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presence on the Council would be more able to address the issue o f  national representation.
The court's decision clearly demonstrates that the NPS may not delegate unlimited 
management discretion to local entities. However, as one legal scholar observ ed, the court, 
“does hint at a permissible management scheme that would allow local officials to participate 
in management decisions.”- ’- Accordingly, under such a scheme, “( 1 ) the NPS would have 
to retain broad oversight authority over any council; (2) the council would have to have more 
NPS representatives; and (3) the representatives o f  local commercial and landowners would 
be limited.”-'" A successful collaboration between the NPS and local entities would therefore 
likely require the NPS to create a group loosely based on the Council, but dominated by NPS 
representatives, and where the NPS has extensive oversight control. Local involvement 
could exist at a secondary level; “The council could then establish several subcommittees 
chaired mainly by local officials, “thereby allowing active participation by these officials in 
management o f  the park.”-'^
It is also important to note that in the two years since the Council was created, it failed 
to adopt any type o f  management plan-even preliminarily-for the River. Perhaps, the 
court’s decision may have been more a reaction to the total lack o f  management rather than 
a finding o f  constitutional violation. By analyzing the case from this perspective, it is
Id.
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possible to distinguish Stanton on its facts, and as such, isolate it from pre\ ious line of 
delegation cases. Arguably, Stanton  should be read narrowly and limited to its facts. 
Furthermore, a legal analysis o f  collaboration should recognize that where the agency retains 
sufficient reviewing authority through compliance with federal laws and regulations, and the 
authority to unilaterally reject proposals, is in line with the case law. Perhaps, the strength 
o f  Stanton  is its detailed analysis that taken in light o f  Ham pton, provides a w orkable 
framework-administrators cannot completely delegate, that is, cannot completely shift their 
responsibilities without sufficient reviewing authority.
The court however, does identify troubling issues. The Council failed to develop any 
meaningful proposal, lacked any oversight and independent review by the agency prior to 
implementation o f  a management plan, had extremely limited national vision and 
perspective, and may have chose a management plan in conflict with national environmental 
issues. Each o f these concerns is unique to the land and resource management arena, 
concerns which previous delegation cases did not face.
In a final analysis, the Stanton  court addresses real concerns about unlimited delegation 
to local entities. The court correctly rejected the N F S ’s authority to delegate such broad 
power in light o f  the Council’s failure to develop any management plan. However, as the 
line o f  cases have found, requiring compliance with federal laws such as NEPA and the ESA, 
and providing agency reviewing authority may go a long way in addressing the concerns that 
the Stanton  court identified.
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3. A M odel o f  Collaborative Decision Makin
This section suggests an alternative to the informal, ad hoc structure o f  collaborati\ e 
efforts in public land decision making. Specifically, collaboration should be incorporated 
into federal land management guidelines on a short term, experimental basis, incorporating 
the criticisms o f  the Quincy Library' Group proposal and the Stanton court decision. While 
collaboration is not appropriate for all land and resource issues, a formal structure should 
include collaboration as one o f  several approaches to decision making.
First, the role o f  collaboration in federal decision making should be explicitly stated: 
collaborative groups should offer input and not make policy, a central criticism o f  the QLG. 
Therefore, collaborative proposals are merely recommendations to the agency at the scoping 
stage and not the implementing stage. Furthermore, collaboration efforts should function 
within existing public land laws. That is, collaboratives must comply with regulations and 
policies set in place to direct management o f  the public lands. For instance, all citizen driven 
proposals must first go through the citizen review process mandated under NEPA. As 
Getches observed, requiring agency participation in the process is more likely to ensure that 
citizen driven proposals are consistent with the national environmental standards. Finally, 
the end result should be merely input “not a finished product needing only official 
ratification.”’ ' " Collaboratives are an additional forum for public input, supplement the notice
215
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and comment and hearing processes already in place.
Alternatively, as advisors to the federal agencies, col!aborati\es retain some 
independence from the agencies and therefore are less likely to be captured by an agency. ■ 
“Most o f  the advantages o f  problem-solving through group discussion can be obtained 
without retreating from the norms o f  a representative democracy, without denying the claims 
o f  national majorities and disenfranchising urban populations. [Collaboration] should simply 
be added to the tool kit for public participation, . . .
While the unlawful sub delegation doctrine provides limits to collaboration, final 
reviewing authority must be interpreted broadly. Because collaboration is an experiment, 
agencies must have both the opportunity to participate as at least equal members but also 
retain the discretion to reject proposals, even in cases where agency participation and 
oversight is limited. By limiting the amount o f  agency participation, local citizens may 
continue to craft creative approaches to managing natural resources without overly burdening 
the agencies.
Lastly, national interests must be included. As this Paper has suggested, the issues facing 
federal lands are fundamentally national issues. While local citizens may be 
disproportionately effected, national concerns must be included in the process. As stated 
earlier, agency participation as well as compliance with NEPA and other environmental laws
:i6
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pro\'ide opportunities to consider national interests.
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VI, Conclusion
Over the past decade collaboration efforts have taken hold across the West. For many 
participants in collaborative efforts, collaboration offers an alternative to status quo 
management on federal lands by engaging the citizens most directly affected by natural 
resource allocation in the decision making process. While criticism o f  collaboration is 
widespread, this Paper suggests that because o f  the rapidly increasing support for 
collaboration, it will remain a force on the political landscape.
However, the scope o f  collaborative authority is unclear. Congressional action and court 
decisions outline contradictory and inconclusive parameters. In 1999, Congress mandated 
the implementation o f  a local citizen group proposal to manage a large area o f Forest Service 
land in northern California. Less than a year after Congress passed the citizen group 
proposal, the D C. District Court unequivocally rejected the National Park Serence's decision 
to delegate management authority for the Niobrara Wild and Scenic River to a local council, 
finding that the agency had violated the unlawful sub delegation doctrine.
These decisions fail to define an appropriate level o f  authority for collaboration. By 
legislatively mandating the Quincy Library Group proposal, Congress legislated too much 
control to local citizens; the allocation o f  natural resource interests extends beyond the local 
community. However, the court’s decision in Stanton may unduly restrain collaboration by 
narrowly defining the boundaries o f  unlawful sub delegation. Therefore, this Paper suggests 
that a formal structure outlining the limits o f  collaboration is both necessary and worthwhile.
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While this may pose a risk, if collaboration is to be truly tested and the potential benefits, as 
well as challenges, realized, federal regulations guiding the decision making process should 
include specific guidelines outlining the role o f  collaboration. A formal structure should 
address the criticisms o f  both the QLG model and the Stanton case. Consequently, 
collaboration should exist within public land laws—legislating citizen initiatives that bypass 
existing laws is a dangerous precedent. Second, the courts should interpret the sub delegation 
doctrine to allow agencies flexibility in both the extent o f  their involvement as well as the 
consideration they attach to collaboratively driven recommendations. And in the end, 
collaboration may become one o f  the several approaches to address the difficult question of 
who decides the allocation o f  federal natural resources.
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